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Environmentalists call it the most important judgment ever in their favour. The 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Hydro-Québec affirmed for the first 
time the jurisdiction of Canada’s Federal Parliament to regulate toxic substances -  
and very likely, jurisdiction to regulate the environment generally.1 The decision is 
also the high-water mark on the interpretation of s. 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 
1867, the criminal law power. In both these respects, Hydro-Québec is an 
extraordinary judgment indeed: one which reaffirms the plenary nature of the 
criminal law power last articulated in the Court’s 1995 RJR-Macdonald judgment,2 
and one which harnesses that power for the advancement of a new, contemporary 
public purpose — the protection of the environment.
1. The Facts
New Years’ Day 1990 did not begin propitiously for Hydro-Québec. On that and 
following days, according to the Crown’s information, the company allegedly 
discharged an illegal quantity of chlorobiphenyls -  also known as polychlorinated 
biphenyls or PCBs for short -  from its high-voltage equipment into the St. Maurice
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Law, for discussions and comment dating back to shortly after the Supreme Court granted leave to 
appeal this case; and Paul Muldoon, Canadian Environmental Law Association, for information on the 
Federal Court challenge to harmonization discussed in the epilogue. Errors that remain are the author’s 
fault entirely. The author discloses that he assisted one of the intervenors, Sierra Legal Defence Fund, 
in researching the scientific literature surrounding PCBs for use at the Supreme Court of Canada, but 
was not retained as counsel, employed by SLDF, or otherwise remunerated for any work in connection 
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'/?, v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 [hereinafter Hydro-Québec],
2RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 [hereinafter RJR- 
MacDona.ld\.
River, a scenic tributary of the St. Lawrence. The company, it is further alleged, 
failed to take timely steps to report the discharge to the authorities.
The gravity of these discharges lies in the pernicious physical qualities of PCBs. 
They are, by universal reckoning, among the most dangerous environmental 
pollutants ever created. Dangerous and long-lived, PCBs can survive undegraded 
in the environment for a decade or more following their release. Air and water, by 
evaporation and precipitation, can transport PCBs over tremendous distances from 
their point of discharge, redepositing them at higher latitudes. There is literally no 
comer of the Earth so remote that PCBs cannot be found there. Worse still, PCBs 
have a tendency to accumulate in the fatty tissues of living things. When a predator 
nourishes itself on prey, it consumes the PCBs in that prey. The food chain is 
organized like Russian dolls, with each higher predator taking in the PCBs in 
creatures below it. Consequently, PCBs biomagnify as they ascend the food chain. 
There is not a human or higher animal alive that does not have measurable levels of 
PCBs in its flesh.3
The combination of a long half-life in the environment, long range atmospheric . 
transport, and the ability to biomagnify makes PCBs some of the most pervasive 
pollutants. Even a jurisdiction that banned PCBs outright would not be able to 
stanch the atmospheric influx o f PCBs from elsewhere. Even the Arctic, hardly a 
focus of industrial activity, is contaminated with PCBs.4 Arctic people such as the 
Inuit, whose traditional diet includes a great deal of fatty, blubber-like foods, are 
among the most contaminated people on Earth.5
While this chronic environmental exposure to PCBs is less than the exposure one 
would receive from ingesting a large quantity of PCBs following an industrial 
accident, it is almost certainly still dangerous to one’s health. Science has yet to
3 S. Dobson and G. van Esch, Polychlorinated Biphenyls and Terphenyls (2nd), Environmental Health 
Criteria series no. 140, World Health Organization (WHO, Geneva, 1993) [hereinafter WHO PCB 
Report].
4 D. Thomas et al., “Arctic terrestrial ecosystem contamination,” Science o f  the Total Environment 
1992; 122( 1 -2): 135-164. See also the chapter entitled “Persistent Organic Pollutants” in Arctic Pollution 
Issues: A State o f  the Arctic Environment Report (Oslo: AMAP, 1997).
5 E. Dewailly et al., “Inuit exposure to organochlorines through the aquatic food chain in Arctic 
Québec,” (1993) 101 Environmental Health Perspectives 618; E. Dewailly e ta l, “High levels of PCBs 
in breast milk of Inuit women from Arctic Québec,” ( 1989) 43 Bulletin o f  Environmental Contamination 
Toxicity 641; P. Ayotte et al., “PCBs and dioxin-like compounds in plasma o f adult Inuit living in 
Nunavik (Arctic Québec),” (1997) 34 Chemosphere 1459.
elucidate all the effects of PCBs at lower doses, not least because the effects are sure 
to vary with the species and age of the organism, the duration of exposure, and the 
specific mélange of PCB isomers in question. The ethical barrier to human 
experimentation means that our knowledge must always be extrapolated from animal 
studies, and in that way is “imperfect.” Such studies tell us that PCBs are toxic to 
laboratory mammals such as rodents or primates,6 and that in wild animals ambient 
environmental exposure is associated with cancers and birth deformities, including 
in endangered species like beluga whales7 -- all of which should be motivation 
enough for remedial action. Nevertheless, PCBs are one of a very few pollutants for 
which there is evidence of harm to human health resulting from environmental 
exposure. To take an example, epidemiological studies of women eating a diet 
enriched in Lake Michigan fish demonstrate that their offspring perform less well 
on tests of cognition, and this impairment is, to a high degree of confidence, because 
of PCBs transmitted prenatally across the placenta.8 One can only suppose what the 
effects may be on people who subsist heavily on a diet of contaminated fish, such 
as the Inuit.
For these reasons, it is not surprising that nearly every jurisdiction, including 
Canada, has imposed legal controls on PCB handling and disposal. A measure of 
international consensus in this regard is that PCBs were the first substance to be 
regulated by Canada’s Environmental Contaminants Act (since repealed), the United 
States’ Toxic Substance Control Act; and the environmental side-agreement of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement.9 A more recent development is the inclusion 
of PCBs on a short-list of twelve Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) that may be
6 WHO PCB Report, supra note 3.
7 P. Beland et al., ‘Toxic compounds and health and reproductive effects in St. Lawrence beluga 
whales,” ( 1993) 19 Journal o f Great Lakes Research 766.
8 The Michigan studies are especially alarming because they clearly track cognitive impairment from 
prenatal PCB exposure in a single cohort o f children; the latest results demonstrate statistically 
significant impairment o f IQ scores, reading comprehension, and memory, persisting to at least the 
eleventh year. As the authors put it, uIn utero exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls in concentrations 
slightly higher than those in the general population can have a long-term impact on intellectual 
function.”: Jacobson JL and Jacobson SW, “Intellectual impairment in children exposed to 
polychlorinated biphenyls in utero,” (1996) 335 New England Journal ofMedicine 783. The Supreme 
Court cited one of the earlier Michican studies in Hydro-Québec, supra note 1 at para. 157. Related 
studies from elsewhere are reviewed in Jacobson J.L. and Jacobson S.W., “Evidence for PCBs as 
neurodevelopmental toxicants in humans,” (1997) 18 Neurotoxicology 415.
9 When CEP A was proclaimed in 1988, it repealed the Environmental Contaminants Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c. E-12. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e); CEC Council ofMinisters Resolution 95-5, 
“Sound Management of Chemicals”, October 1995.
banned outright by an international treaty now being negotiated under the auspices 
of UNEP.10
At the date of the alleged offence in R. v. Hydro-Québec, PCBs of all kinds were 
designated “toxic substances” by the Chlorobiphenyls Interim Order (the “Interim 
Order”), which is subordinate legislation under the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act, or CEP A .11 In particular, Hydro-Québec was charged with a violation 
of s. 6(a) of the Interim Order, which prohibited the discharge of PCBs from 
electrical equipment into the environment in excess of 1 gram per day.12 Any 
violation of that section triggers s. 36 of CEPA, which requires the polluter to report 
the offending release promptly to the authorities. The discharge limit and the 
attendant reporting requirement are prosecuted as summary or indictable strict 
liability offences, punishable by a fine of up to $1 million or three years 
imprisonment.13 Proceedings were brought against Hydro-Québec as a summary 
prosecution.
The merits hearing was pre-empted by Hydro-Québec’s motion to dismiss, on 
the grounds that both the Interim Order, and its enabling sections under CEPA, were 
ultra vires federal jurisdiction. In particular, Hydro-Québec alleged the law was not 
valid as criminal law; law for the Peace, Order and Good Government (POGG) of 
Canada; or in respect of any other federal head of power. It succeeded with that 
argument at three levels of court below, each time eliciting nearly the same reasons 
from the bench: that CEPA was substantively too encompassing, and in the same 
breath, that its pith and substance was intolerably broad.
10 The First Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC-1) for an International Legally Binding 
Instrument for Implementing International Action on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants met in 
Montreal from 29 June to 3 July, 1998. At least four such further INCs are anticipated before settling 
the final text of a treaty, probably by the end of the year 2000. If successful, the treaty will likely be the 
first international agreement to ban the manufacture, use, sale and release of a pollutant. Possible 
substantive terms appear at UNEP/POPS/INC. 1/4 .
11Canadian Environmental Protection Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 16 [hereinafter CEPA]', Chlorobiphenyls 
Interim Order, P.C. 1989-296, February 23, 1989 [hereinafter Interim Order].
12 Section 6(ja) of the Interim Order reads in part:
The quantity of chlorobiphenyls that may be released into the environment shall not exceed 
1 gram per day in respect of any item of equipment or any receptacle or material containing 
equipment in the course of operation, servicing, maintenance, decommissioning, transporting 
or storage of:
(a) electrical capacitors and electrical transformers and associated electrical equipment 
manufactured in or imported into Canada before July 1, 1980...
13 CEPA, supra note 11 at s. 113.
2. CEPA, the Interim Order, and the Judgments Below
CEPA, it must be conceded, is one of the most open-ended Acts ever written. It 
would be difficult for it to be otherwise, for the simple reason that it treats its 
eponymous purpose -  “environmental protection” -  quite in earnest. CEPA’s nine 
Parts deal, inter alia, with environmental codes of practice; aquatic nutrients; 
environmental control on federal lands; international air pollution; ocean dumping; 
and of course, toxic substances.14 Tying all these Parts together into omnibus 
legislation -  dealing with the terrestrial, aquatic and marine environments, in both 
their national and international dimensions -  in practice means there must be some 
disconcertingly broad definitions in the Act. The most encompassing is the definition 
of the environment itself:
“environment” means the components o f  the Earth and includes
(a) air, land and water,
(b) all layers o f  the atmosphere,
(c) all organic and inorganic matter [i.e. all inanimate things] and living organisms, 
and
(d) the interacting natural systems that include components referred to in paragraphs
(a) to (c ).15
It is difficult to conceive of a definition of “environment” that could, in 
principle, afford more latitude to impose on provincial jurisdiction. Much the same 
criticism may be levied at the terms that are the namesake of Part II of the Act, 
“Toxic Substances.” A “substance” includes, inter alia, “any matter that is capable 
of being dispersed in the environment”; “any element or free radical”; and “any 
combination of elements of a particular molecular identity.” Stripping those phrases 
of their chemistiy jargon, it really does not go too far to say that if a thing is built of 
atoms, it may qualify as a CEPA “substance.”
Obviously, this apparent breadth needs to be tempered in some way. This is 
done by s. 11 of Part II, which lays down a test whereby a “substance” may be 
qualified as “toxic.” Section 11 is the threshold of Part II, and deserves careful 
consideration for that reason:
14 Two o f CEPA's Parts -  Part V (International Air Pollution) and Part VI (Ocean Dumping) -  replace 
statutes that were formerly upheld under the POGG power: See/?, v. Crown Zellerbach, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 
401 [hereinafter Crown Zellerbach]', Re Canada Metal Co. (1982), 144 D.L.R. (3d) 124 (Man. Q.B.).
{iCEPA, supra note 11 at s. 3.
11. For the purposes of this Part, a substance is toxic if it is entering or may enter the 
environment in a quantity or concentration or under conditions
(a) having or that may have an immediate or long-term harmful effect on the 
environment;
(b) constituting or that may constitute a danger to the environment on which human life 
depends; or
(c) constituting or that may constitute a danger in Canada to human life or health.
A substance is “toxic”, and therefore susceptible to regulation under Part II, if 
it is injurious or potentially injurious in a limited number of ways. These can 
essentially be distilled down into two rules of thumb. Rule one is paraphrased by the 
so-called “three E’s of CEP A toxicity”: that a toxic substance must enter (or possibly 
enter) the environment, such that the resulting exposure is of such a quantity or 
concentration that some harmful effect will (or possibly will) occur. Rule two is 
simply that the harmful effect in question must result to either the environment/?^ 
se\ the environment upon which human life depends; or human life perse.
A few extreme, hypothetical examples illustrate how s. 11 may operate. At the 
most “green” extreme, the disjunctive subparagraphs of s. 11 allow a substance to 
be regulated as “toxic” if exposure to it is possibly inimical to the environment, even 
if exposure does no harm to humans.16 An example of such a substance is DDT, 
which ravages ecosystems but is harmless to humans in ordinary exposures.17 At the 
opposite, “brown” extreme, the requirement to satisfy the “three E’s” can place a 
limit on what is toxic. For instance, a notional substance that billows liberally out 
of Canadian smokestacks and is uniquely lethal to Saurus Cranes (a species found 
only in Vietnam) may not enter their distant habitat at concentrations sufficient to 
cause harmful effects, and may therefore not be “toxic” under Part II. Seen in this
16 The use of the English word “or” concluding subparagraph (b) signals that the subparagraphs are 
disjunctive. It is likely an artifact of sloppy drafting that there is not a corresponding “ou” in the French 
version of that subparagraph.
17 It is widely accepted that DDT is acutely toxic to insects and chronically toxic to certain higher-order 
carnivores such as birds of prey. It is equally accepted that ordinary exposures are not acutely toxic to 
humans (e.g. occupational exposure in the course of spraying). Having said that, people who subsist on 
a diet rich in marine mammals, such as the Inuit, are thought to risk chronic DDT toxicity through this 
extraordinary exposure. Whether this exposure, which results largely from long-range transport of DDT 
from outside Canada, should figure in assessing whether DDT is “toxic” for the purposes of CEP A is 
a tantalizing question. On the other side of that coin, query whether the fact that people in the tropics 
use DDT to stave off lethal epidemics of malaria -  thus obtaining a health benefit -  should matter to the 
toxicity assessment. In sum, should effects resulting from global causes be comparably weighed as 
effects resulting from national causes, and can health benefits of using a substance be traded off against 
attendant health costs, in arriving at a finding of toxicity?
light, CEP A 's definition of toxicity is actually narrower than the scientific meaning 
of the word, which focuses simply on the substance’s ability to cause mortality or 
morbidity on any species, at any concentration, quite apart from its potential to do 
so in the course of ordinary or foreseeable exposure.18
In practice, the application of s. 11 falls to the discretion of the Ministers of 
Environment and Health, who adopt meticulous, science-led toxicity assessment that 
lists substances according to their real or suspected toxicity under CEP A. The net 
effect is to impose a strict procedural bottleneck at the threshold of CEPA which 
mitigates the Act’s substantive broadness and ensures a tolerable degree of 
infringement of provincial jurisdiction. This procedure involves managing several 
lists of substances, corresponding to the stages of a toxicity assessment. A general 
“Domestic Substances List” (the DSL) contains the common and chemical names 
of all substances in use in Canada since 1984 -  over 21,000 substances at the time 
of the Supreme Court hearing.19 Of these substances, a tiny subset (44) were 
designated by the Ministers for inclusion on the “Priority Substances List” because 
they are suspected to be toxic.20 Designating a substance to this list triggers a 
requirement that the Ministers gather information on the substance for a 
comprehensive scientific assessment, taking up to five years. This assessment leads
18 “In scientific parlance, toxicity is the inherent capability of a substance to cause harm, which does not 
take into account exposure. However, the definition under section 11 o f the Act is a legal one which 
may be equated with risk since it embodies the concept that harm to the environment or to human health 
is a function of both intrinsic toxicity (i.e. toxicity in the traditional sense) and the extent of exposure...”: 
Canada, Health Canada, Canadian Environmental Protection Act - Human Health Risk Assessment for  
Priority Substances (Ottawa:, Health Canada, 1994), p. 2. The crude, “traditional sense” o f toxicity is 
what scientists report by statistics such as LD50 (96 h), which is the concentration of a toxin at which 
50% o f a population o f a certain experimental animal will die in the course of a 96 hour exposure. By 
imposing the further criteria of entry, or possible entry, to the environment; and lowering the regulatory 
threshold from exposure at which there is actual danger or harm to a level at which exposure “may 
constitute a danger” or “may have” harmful effects; a finding of CEPA toxicity comprises both a 
scientific determination, usually from experimental studies, and a considered judgment, erring in all 
cases on the side o f precaution, as to the probability of entry into the environment and the probability 
of resulting effects. To reiterate in part, the severity o f these effects is appropriately not a consideration, 
and a de minimis effect -  i.e. one that may be, but is not positively a danger -  is sufficient to bring a 
substance within the definition of CEPA toxicity.
19 CEPA, supra note 11 at s. 25( 1 ). At the time o f the Supreme Court hearing, the Domestic Substances 
Lists in force were SI/91-148, Canada Gazette, Part I Supp., January 26, 1991; and SOR/94-311, as 
amended SOR/95-517. A “Non-Domestic Substances List” comprises another45,000 substances known 
but not used in Canada: CEPA, s. 25(2).
20CEPA, supra note 11 ats. 12. At the time o f the Supreme Court hearing, a single Priority Substances 
List was in force: Canada Gazette, Part I, February 11, 1989 at 543.
to a recommendation or refusal to designate the substance as toxic.21 The 
recommendation is finally subject to the discretion of the Governor in Council, who 
may order a that a substance found to be toxic be added to the “List of Toxic 
Substances” in Schedule I of the Act. Only then is a substance able to be regulated.22
The procedural steps of the toxicity assessment that take a substance from the 
DSL to the List of Toxic Substances can happen at the sole behest of the federal 
government, but the next step -  enacting a regulation -  cannot take place until the 
Governor in Council consults a federal-provincial advisory committee. This 
requirement is somewhat relaxed in the case of an interim order, which is a 
temporary regulation lasting up to two years, exercisable in case of emergency or as 
a stopgap measure where a substance is believed toxic but is not yet listed as such. 
The Ministers may make the interim order, subject to the requirement that the 
provinces are invited to consult within twenty-four hours thereafter.23 There is thus 
no way to regulate a substance, even in case of emergency, without at some point 
consulting the provinces.
It should be plain that the procedural barriers to regulation, both in toxicity 
assessment and provincial consultation, place a formidable brake on how CEP A is 
used. Proof of this lies in the fact that at the time of the Supreme Court hearing, only 
two substances -  just 0.01% of those on the DSL -  had run this gauntlet and been 
made the subject of a CEP A regulation. Another small number were the subject of 
interim orders. The tiny number of substances controlled under CEPA hardly spoke 
in aid of what might be termed “the Chicken Little argument”: that the substantive 
breadth of CEPA would cause the sky to fall on provincial jurisdiction.
It was just this argument that, in the judgments of the courts below, was fatal to 
the criminal law argument. The first instance judgment of Babin J. is the best 
reasoned, and is broadly concurred in by the other Québec courts. The gravamen of 
Babin J.’s decision is that the substantive broadness of CEPA, marked by the wide 
definitions of the “environment” and “toxic” substances, support a generous 
characterization of the pith and substance of the Act and Interim Order. All the
21 CEPA, supra note 11 at ss. 14-16, 89(5). For an example of the scientific review, which is very 
thorough, see Canada, Environment Canada and Health and Welfare Canada, CEPA Priority Substances 
List Assessment Report for Toluene (Ottawa: Environment Canada, 1992), and the subsequent report of 
the results in the Canada Gazette, Part I (January 30, 1993) at 264.
22 CEPA, supra note 11 at ss. 33, 34 and Schedule I.
23 Ibid. at s. 35.
courts noted that the Act contemplated regulation not only to protect human health, 
but also to protect the environment in its own right.24 The effect of this liberal 
inclusion would be to take the Act outside the classic formulation of the criminal law 
power, given famously by Justice Rand in the 1949 Margarine Reference:
A crime is an act which the law, with appropriate penal sanction forbids; but as 
prohibitions are not enacted in a vacuum, we can properly look for some evil or 
injurious or undesirable effect upon the public against which the law is directed.
That effect may be in relation to social, economic or political interests; and the 
legislature has had in mind to suppress the evil or to safeguard the interest 
threatened... [Thus when is] the prohibition then enacted with a view to a public 
purpose which can support it as being in relation to criminal law? Public peace, 
order, security, health, morality: these are the ordinary though not exclusive ends 
served bv fthe criminal law].25
The omission of environmental protection from this list is a conspicuous 
absence. Suffice it to say that in characterizing the pith and substance as protection 
of the environment, and not more narrowly as the protection of health, the lower 
courts went seriously outside the facts of the case. While it is correct that s. 11(a) 
contemplates the regulation of a substance toxic to the environment in its own right, 
the fact is that PCBs are not such a substance, and the Interim Order does not present 
such a case. Quite apart from the scientific merits underlying this view, the 
preamble to the Interim Order itself states that:
[The] Minister of the Environment and the Minister of National Health and Welfare 
believe that chlorobiphenyls [i.e. PCBs] are not adequately regulated and that 
immediate action is required to deal with a significant danger to the environment and 
to human life and health.26
That preamble, signed by then-federal Environment Minister Lucien Bouchard 
(that is, the same Mr. Bouchard whose provincial Attorney General attacked the
24 “Je ne suis pas d’accord avec la prétention de la substitut de la Procureure Générale du Canada que 
le but [de l’Arrêté d’urgence et les dispositions habilitantes dans l’Acte] est la protection de la santé 
publique. Le but me semble plus large que cela. Il vise aussi la protection de l’environnement. Et la 
protection de l’environnement n’a pas nécessairement de conséquence directe sur la santé publique.”: 
[1991] R.J.Q. 2736 at 2743, per Babin J.; and in the same vein, [1992] R.J.Q. 2159 at 2163, per Trotier 
J.; [1995] R.J.Q. 398 at 405, per Tourigny J.A.
25 Re: Validity o f  Section 5(a) o f the Dairy Industry Act, [1949] S.C.R. 1, at 49-50 [hereinafter the 
Margarine Reference; emphasis added].
“ Interim Order, supra note 11 [emphasis added].
constitutional validity of the Interim Order at the Supreme Court27), is further 
buttressed by an “Explanatory Note” appended to the Interim Order:
The purpose of the attached interim order is to clarify an uncertainty in law...[and] 
to eliminate any possible doubt about the validity of regulations continued [from the 
repealed Environmental Contaminants Act] under the Act, and to avoid any threat 
to the environment or human life or health posed by the substance named below.28
Thus, despite legislative evidence as to the purpose of the Interim Order, and the fact 
that PCBs are readily appreciated as “toxic” to human health, the courts below 
declined to uphold the Interim Order as intra vires the criminal law power.
But even if one supposes that the Interim Order is valid criminal law and that 
procedural hurdles limit the number of CEPA regulations, a final objection may lie 
on the very considerable degree or extent to which CEPA and its regulations can 
intrude on provincial affairs. To put it another way, once a Minister is free to 
regulate, the concern is that he or she has too much power to do so. This objection 
is, at bottom, a corollary of the Federal Principle: the typically Canadian subtext that 
urges the law to reflect a pragmatic balance of powers between the federal and 
provincial poles. The Federal Principle signifies the proposition that a law which is 
formally and technically intra vires may nonetheless be suspect constitutionally if 
it disturbs the existing balance unacceptably. Wrong-footing this Principle proved 
to be CEPA's undoing, in two different ways.
The first misstep had to do with the combination of CEPA's substantive breadth 
and the lower court’s narrow interpretation of the federal criminal law power. It
27 It is hard to overstate the Machiavellian perfidy of Mr. Bouchard in this respect. As Environment 
Minister, he addressed Parliament’s Standing Committee on Environment, warning that PCBs are “a 
very dangerous and toxic substance,” and talking of his “department’s policy...to establish and request 
national standards,” which he supported because “it does not make sense to accept...that we would have 
a patchwork of [provincial] regulations...”. Even after leaving the federal government and taking 
leadership of the Bloc Québécois, Bouchard preached that, “for the time being, Ottawa has powers and 
jurisdictions in the environment, and it might be that even some nationalists in Québec must thank God 
for that, because Québec is not taking care o f its environment now.” What a change a few years, a 
referendum, and a taste of governance wreak on a politician! See A. Attaran, “Lucien Bouchard’s 
environmental flip”, The Globe and Mail (October 3,1996), A21 ; Canada, House of Commons Standing 
Committee on the Environment, Minutes o f  Proceedings and Evidence respecting Bill C-22: An Act to 
amend the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, issue 13 p. 12 (June 26, 1989) and issue 16 at p.
18 (October 5, 1989); G. Hamilton, “Québec Lax on Environment: Bouchard”, Montreal Gazette 
(October 30,1990), p. A l.
“ Interim Order, supra note 11.
cannot be doubted that s. 34 o f CEPA, one of the so-called “enabling” provisions of 
the Act, gives vast discretion to the Ministers in deciding how to regulate a toxic 
substance. This opens the door to regulating matters that ordinarily would be viewed 
as local and private, or affecting civil rights in the province. Indeed, it would be 
accurate to say that to the extent a regulation does not trench on areas o f provincial 
competence, it because o f an act o f Ministerial restraint in applying s. 34. Some 
examples drawn from the twenty-four subparagraphs o f s. 34 illustrate the 
tremendous regulatory latitude available to the Ministers in this regard:
34.(1) Subject to subsection (3), the Governor in Council may, on the recommendation 
of the Ministers and after the federal-provincial advisory committee is given an 
opportunity to provide its advice under section 6, make regulations with respect to a 
substance specified on the List of Toxic Substances in Schedule I, including regulations 
providing for, or imposing requirements respecting,
(a) the quantity or concentration of the substance that may be released into the 
environment either alone or in combination with any other substance from any source or 
type of source;
(c) the commercial, manufacturing or processing activity in the course of which the 
substance may be released;
(e) the quantity of the substance that may be manufactured, processed, used, offered for 
sale or sold in Canada;
(f) the purposes for which the substance or a product containing the substance may be 
imported, manufactured, processed, used, offered for sale or sold;
(h) the quantities or concentrations in which the substance may be used;
(1) the total, partial or conditional prohibition of the manufacture, use, processing, sale, 
offering for sale, import or export of the substance or a product containing the substance;
(n) the manner in which and conditions under which and the purposes for which the 
substance or a product containing the substance may be advertised or offered for sale; 
(o) the manner in which and conditions under which the substance or a product or 
material containing the substance may be stored, displayed, handled, transported or 
offered for transport;
(p) the packaging and labeling of the substance or a product or material containing the 
substance;
(q) the manner, conditions, places and method of disposal of the substance or a product 
or material containing the substance, including standards for the construction, 
maintenance and inspection of disposal sites;
(x) any other matter necessary to carry out the purposes of this Part.29
Certainly, the regulatory modalities o f CEPA are wide-ranging. Some, as in 
subparagraphs (a), (h), and (p), are intimately connected with the control o f toxics
-  indeed, .it is hard to imagine how such legislation could be effective if it did not 
make provision for rules that limit quantities and concentrations of a toxin, or rules 
for safe labeling. Others subparagraphs, such as (c) through (f) and (1), are perhaps 
sustainable under the federal trade and commerce power. But these subparagraphs 
aside, much o f the rest o f s. 34 appears to be less apposite to the purpose of 
controlling toxics, than to property and civil rights, or matters o f a local and private 
nature in the province. Subparagraphs (o) and (q) stand out as the constitutionally 
sore thumbs o f CEPA, for they do not prohibit acts involving toxics so much as 
qualify or regulate how toxics are locally marketed or handled. Finally, 
subparagraph (x) seems designed for nothing other than catching aspects o f 
marketing or handling that, for whatever reason, prove desirable but were missed in 
drafting the Act.
All the lower courts took umbrage at the sweeping regulatory jurisdiction 
conferred by s. 34, finding it irreconcilable with their conception o f the federal 
criminal law power. A digression is necessary here to explain why. Though the 
Margarine Reference provides for a formulaic definition o f the criminal law -  a 
prohibition, plus a penalty, plus a public purpose -  such a definition can appear 
distressingly simplistic because it leaves an open door to excesses o f federal 
jurisdiction. Those who dislike the Margarine Reference would argue that a rule of 
form or construction is an impoverished basis on which to allocate legislative power 
within the scheme o f the Constitution, and that a different, more principled 
consideration befits the division o f powers. One solution can be to classify laws into 
those that are prohibitory in earnest and therefore truly “criminal”, and those that are 
merely “regulatory”; and the latter, which can intrude multifariously on provincial 
power, offend the Federal Principle and should be ultra vires. This is the logic the 
lower courts seem to have applied in deciding that s. 34 was more “regulatory” than 
“criminal”, and therefore outside the criminal law power.30
29 The partidular examples chosen are among those singled out as offensive to the Federal Principle in 
the submission of the Attorney-General of Québec. See that intervenor’s Supreme Court factum at 5-10.
30 “J ’estime qu’en l’espèce l’Arrêté d ’urgence sur les biphényles chlorés excède largement le cadre du 
droit criminel; il empiète sur plusieurs champs de compétences législatives exclusives provinciales. Par 
conséquent, je  suis d ’avis que cet Arrêté d ’urgence ne peut se justifier par le pouvoir du Parlement de 
légiférer en matière de droit criminel, même s’il interdit une conduite et assortit cette interdiction de 
sanctions pénales.” : [1995] R.J.Q. 398 at 409, per Tourigny J.A.; and in the same vein [1991] R.J.Q.
The second way in which the Federal Principle proved decisive was in the lower 
courts' refusal to uphold CEPA and the Interim Order under the national concern 
doctrine o f POGG.31 Recall that the penultimate test articulated by Mr. Justice Le 
Dain in Crown Zellerbach is that a matter seeking to qualify under the national 
concern doctrine must have “a scale o f impact on provincial jurisdiction that is 
reconcilable with the fundamental distribution of legislative power under the 
Constitution.” This requirement is, by any other name, a restatement o f the Federal 
Principle.32 It is unsurprising then that the substantive breadth o f s. 34 proved fatal 
to the POGG argument, just as it had to the criminal law argument.33
What is more, the wide definitions given the terms “environment” and “toxic”, 
and the scope for application these conferred on the Interim Order was, in the 
opinion of the trial judge, incompatible with the “degree o f singleness, 
distinctiveness and indivisibility” that a measure requires under the national concern 
doctrine.34 The way this conclusion was reached is interesting. Rather than duly 
characterizing the pith and substance o f CEPA and the Interim Order, which is the 
usual first step in constitutional inquiry, the trial judge turned to CEPA's definitions 
and theorized about the potential excesses to which CEPA could be put. Noting that 
the “environment” comprised earth, air and water, he concluded:
Le libellé de l’article 6(a) de l’Arrêté d’urgence (i.e. the Interim Order) ne nuance 
pas entre les rejets dans l’environnement qui peuvent avoir des conséquences extra­
provinciales et ceux qui n’en ont pas. Et il y a certainement des rejets de substances 
toxiques qui sont bien localisés, à l’intérieur d’une province et qui le demeurent...
2736 at 2743-4, per Babin J. More to the point, at the Cour Supérieur de Québec, the objection was 
made that “les pouvoirs du govemeur en conseil à l’égard des substances considérées comme toxiques 
au sens de l’article 11(a) [ont] pour véritable objet de réglementer non de prohiber.": [1992] R.J.Q. 
2159 at 2166, per Trotier J. [emphasis in original].
31 Canada generally relied on the national concern branch of POGG, save for a spurious attempt to rely 
on the emergency branch at the Court of Appeal. While the Interim Order, which is temporary in nature, 
possibly could be sustained under the emergency branch, its enabling provisions in CEPA are enduring 
and could not: Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373. Had the argument succeeded, it 
would have done so with the odd result that the vires of the Interim Order would, o f necessity, differ 
from that of the enabling statute! Interestingly, Canada never argued the somewhat moribund “gap” 
branch of POGG last used in R. v. Hauser, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 984, although it is arguable that industrial 
scale toxic pollution, and PCB contamination, are matters arising only since confederation.
32 Crown Zellerbach, supra note 14 at 431 -2. Or as Babin J. of the Court of Québec paraphrased this 
part o f Justice Le Dain's test, “Quel serait l’effet de cette attribution au Parlement sur le partage des 
pouvoirs?” supra note 30 at 2742.
33 See, for instance, [1992] R.J.Q. 2159 at 2164-5, per Trotier J. (Qué S.C.).
34 Crown Zellerbach, supra note 14 at 431 -2.
[Donc] l’application de l’article 6(a) est trop large, mais une partie de la matière n’a 
certainement pas attient cette dimension d’intérêt national.35
The judge commented similarly on the definition o f toxic:
11 est à noter...qu’une substance peut être “listée” toxique sans qu’elle ait 
d’incidence sur la santé.36
With respect, the trial judge’s reasoning rests on certain suppositions, rather than 
the facts o f the case. It does not follow that because a law’s definitions afford it a 
great sphere o f influence -  e.g. over all “toxics” in the total “environment” -  that 
the pith and substance o f the law must necessarily be inappropriate to single, distinct 
and indivisible legislative treatment. Rather, the correct threshold of singleness, 
distinctness and indivisibility is, as Justice Le Dain noted, whether the effect o f a 
province failing to address the matter has consequences that are felt outside that 
province’s jurisdictional, territorial boundaries (the so-called “provincial inability” 
test). The possibility that a notional pollutant remains localized within a province, 
or is harmless to health, should be beside the point. This case is about PCB -  a 
substance that is known to disperse to the most distant comers of the Earth, and that 
certainly does harm human health. Simply put, those are the adjudicative facts 
germane to the constitutional question; and it is inappropriate to substitute in their 
stead imprecise musings about how pollutants disperse and do damage. The same 
error, to greater or lesser extents, was made by the Québec Superior Court and the 
Court o f Appeal.
In conclusion, the passage o f the case through the lower courts foundered for 
two fundamental reasons, although these were permuted in a handful o f ways: first, 
the courts found CEPA was too substantively broad and therefore offensive to the 
Federal Principle, in the context o f the criminal law power and POGG both; second, 
the courts decided the case not on the facts o f the PCB Interim Order, but on the 
speculative excesses to which CEPA could be put. Why dwell on this history? Only 
for the reason that it sets the stage for some o f the more egregious mistakes to be 
made again at the Supreme Court o f Canada.
35 [1991] R.J.Q. 2736 at 2742 and following.
i6Ibid. at 2743.
3. The Supreme Court of Canada
Vindicating CEPA did not come easy. All in all, it took more than seven years to 
settle the constitutional questions, and 2 Vz years just to get the matter through the 
Québec Court o f Appeal. The Attorney-General o f Québec, who was mis en cause 
for the accused corporation at first instance, was later joined by two more 
intervenors attacking the legislation at the Supreme Court. On the other side, five 
intervenors joined the respondent Attorney-General o f Canada. It is o f some interest 
that the Attorney-General o f Canada, which had lost in all the lower courts, never 
appeared to change tack. Its argument at the Supreme Court was little altered from 
its arguments below; and in oral submissions, it appeared to irritate the bench by 
conflating its arguments on the criminal law and peace, order and good 
government.37
In the end, a narrow majority (5-4) decided to uphold the validity of CEPA and 
the Interim Order under the criminal law power, with Justice LaForest writing for 
the majority, and Justices Lamer and Iacobucci penning the dissent. By that 
decision, the Court created a power that environmentalists had theorized anticipated 
for at least three decades: a paramount, federal power to legislate, unlimited by the 
features o f its objects, over matters injurious to either human- or non-human 
environmental values.
The ironic thing about Hydro-Québec is that although it is a landmark federalism 
case, the momentousness o f its result does not leave this impression. In the criminal 
law power, there are neither finely-tuned tests, nor historical rehashings o f the kind 
that give shape and limit to the other constitutional powers. The results in the courts 
below illustrate the resistance toward accommodating a subject as contiguous and 
broad as the environment within a federal paradigm. It is little surprise that judges 
feel unease at forcing the square peg o f the environment -  “a constitutionally 
abstruse matter which does not comfortably fit within the existing division o f powers 
without considerable overlap and uncertainty” -  into the round holes that are the 
federal heads o f power o f the Constitution.38
Up to now, the only solution has been to turn federal jurisdiction over the 
environment out o f the subject-specific heads o f power. Hence, legislative
37 The comments o f Justice La Forest at paras. 117 and 109 reflect this.
38 Justice La Forest in Friends o f the Oldman River v. Canada, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3 at 64 [hereinafter 
Oldman River],
competence over fisheries encompasses jurisdiction to protect an aquatic milieu 
healthy for fish39; or that a permitting discretion over structures affecting navigation 
may be exercised with a view to the environmental impacts resulting from those 
structures.40 While this subject-specific mode o f legislation confers a considerable 
degree of environmental jurisdiction, the subject remains the limitation. The Fathers 
of Confederation did not assign the heads o f federal power because o f their 
convenience as toeholds for environmental jurisdiction. Even where such a toehold 
exists, the nexus that is required between an environmental measure and the federal 
subject can be a stringent one. If  an environmental measure is not “necessarily 
incidental” to legislation within the federal head of power,41 or if the motives behind 
it are colourable, it will not stand.
From an ecological point o f view, the subject-specific mode turns the continuity, 
fluidity and holism o f environmental problems into legal caricatures. Unlike tax or 
corporate lawyers, who deal with subjects that are themselves creatures of the law, 
environmental lawyers must master the habit o f transposing and dissecting 
magnificent natural facts into desiccated, piecemeal causes o f action. Viewed 
through the lens o f federalism, a forested coastal watershed that is home to bears and 
birds is a disarticulated assemblage o f navigable waters, territorial waters, fish, and 
migratory birds (all o f which are federal42); plus water rights, surface and subsurface 
resource rights, and wildlife (all o f which are provincial43).
Since the law prohibits the delegation o f legislative competence to the provinces 
(sometimes called “interdelegation”), the only way the federal government may 
cross these lines is by resort to a plenary, non-subject based jurisdiction. Now, the 
criminal law and POGG, in contrast to the subject-specific modes o f jurisdiction, can 
apply to whatever subject; but as the experience in the lower courts shows, judges 
tend to constrain them by the Federal Principle. The real advance o f Hydro-Québec, 
it will be seen, is that it both frees federal environmental jurisdiction from the 
subject-specific heads o f power, and exorcizes the ghost o f the Federal Principle
39 Northwest Falling Contractors Ltd. v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 292.
40 Oldman River, supra note 38.
41 Fowler v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 213 (wherein a blanket prohibition against polluting a fish 
stream was ultra vires because there was no nexus between the pollutant in question and harm to fish; 
i.e. the prohibition was not “necessarily incidental” to protecting fisheries).
42ss. 91 ( 10), 91 ( 12); Crown Zellerbach, supra note 14; Migratory Birds Convention Act, R.S.C., c. M- 
7.01.
43 ss. 92(5), 92(13), 92(16), 92A(1 ).
from the criminal law power. This sounds revolutionary, but as revolutions go it was 
a somewhat predictable one. The majority judgment is quite faithful to criminal law 
precedent, and the step o f creating a plenary federal environmental jurisdiction is 
actually logically inaudacious once those precedents are recognized. If  some would 
call Hydro-Québec a politically bold judgment, it is only because the judicial history 
o f the criminal law power escapes them, and they are moved by scaremongering 
about how the judgment upsets the existing balance o f powers. This captures the 
essence of the minority judgment, which rests on an interpretation o f the criminal 
law that, in truth, never really existed.
3(a). The Constitutional Question and the Pith and Substance
It is a truism of federalism litigation that characterizing an impugned act, and urging 
the “right” pith and substance on the Court, is the soft battle that often proves 
dispositive o f the result. Contrasting the pith and substance of the majority and 
minority in Hydro-Québec confirms this truth. A theme that runs throughout the 
judgments is whether to characterize and adjudicate narrowly or broadly, that is to 
say, to characterize by having regard to the facts o f the PCB Interim Order, or to 
characterize on the whole o f Part II o f CEPA. This bears careful explanation.
In litigating the constitutionality o f subordinate legislation such as a regulation, 
an interesting question can arise as to the appropriate plane o f constitutional 
scrutiny. Assuming that the regulation is validly enacted under a regulation-making 
power o f the parent Act, then to what degree should a constitutional challenge 
against the regulation also inhere against the parent Act? If  the regulation is 
unconstitutional on its face, then it seems the parent Act may be suspect too, because 
it is the authority under which the unconstitutional regulation was enacted. In that 
case, it seems entirely appropriate that the challenger should be entitled to impugn 
the parent Act, and to bring this challenge by reference to the facts in which the 
unconsitutional regulation was promulgated. That is surely uncontroversial. 
Considerably more difficult is the case where the regulation appears constitutional 
on its face. Here again, it seems fair that the challenger be allowed to probe the 
constitutionality o f the parent Act, to ensure that it is itself intra vires the 
Constitution and thus able to support the regulation. But on what facts should this 
probe be allowed? Imagine that the parent Act confers a very wide discretion over 
the instance and content o f a regulation. It may be that by keeping the inquiry to the 
factualplane, being the facts arising in the particular case impugning the regulation, 
that the Act’s discretion is being exercised constitutionally. Yet while this is so, it 
may also be that the Act could, on a hypothetical plane involving certain imaginary 
facts, be exercised unconstitutionally (for a colourable purpose, say). Where, then,
is the true pith and substance o f the Act to be found: on the factual or the 
hypothetical plane? To put it another way, should a court characterize and try the 
case on its particular adjudicative facts; or should it have regard to the more general 
construction o f the statute, as it does in a constitutional reference?
This dilemma is vexing because neither approach is obviously correct. The 
vibrancy o f a lis inter partes belongs to the factual plane alone; but the hypothetical 
plane lends itself to a more general approach that, in the long run, may better serve 
judicial economy by keeping challenges o f the same Act out o f the courts. Where 
the dilemma arises, the function o f the Chief Justice in stating a constitutional 
question assumes great importance in signaling counsel at which plane the Court 
wishes arguments to be directed. The constitutional question may be stated either 
narrowly, to hew closely to the facts at bar; or it may, in the style o f a reference 
question, probe more deeply and generally into the Act’s prospective validity. The 
constitutional question in Hydro-Québec was written quite narrowly:
Do s. 6(a) of the Chlorobiphenyls Interim Order, PC 1989-296, and the enabling 
legislative provisions, ss. 34 and 35 of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 
R.S.C., 1985, c. 16 (4th Supp.) fall in whole or in part within the jurisdiction of the 
Parliament of Canada to make laws for the peace, order and good government of 
Canada pursuant to s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 or its criminal law 
jurisdiction under s. 91 (27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 or otherwise fall within its 
jurisdiction?
This question impugns solely s. 6(a) o f the Interim Order (the PCB emissions limit 
that Hydro-Québec allegedly breached), and the barest sliver o f CEPA, sections 34 
and 35 (the enabling provisions for interim orders). The narrowness o f the question 
would seem to confine the appeal to the factual plane, for it hardly invites scrutiny 
o f the vires o f Part II as a whole, much less the full chapter and verse o f CEPA. 
Perhaps this is an artifact o f the way constitutional questions are prepared: though 
the Chief Justice states questions, it is the appellant who nominates questions to him. 
It seems certain the Crown took full advantage o f this and nominated a narrow 
constitutional question — which is all the better since it suits a narrow 
characterization later.44
It is hardly surprising that the parties could not agree on characterization: Hydro- 
Québec sought to characterize the pith and substance o f matters generally, as relating
44 The question submitted by the Crown was adopted by the Chief Justice verbatim in this case.
to “the protection o f the environment”; but the Crown took a much narrower view, 
characterizing matters as “the control o f chemical pollution”.45
The Court, too, was vexed by characterization. Consider first the dissenting 
reasons o f Justices Lamer and Iacobucci, who adopt a wide characterization of 
matters:
We believe the pith and substance of Part II of the Act lies in the wholesale 
regulation by federal agents of any and all substances which may harm any aspect 
of the environment or which may present a danger to human life or health. That is, 
the impugned provisions are in pith and substance aimed at protecting the 
environment and human life and health from any and all harmful substances by 
regulating these substances.46
This is a curious passage, because it actually characterizes two different things: 
‘Part II o f the Act,’ and the ‘impugned provisions.’ Stranger still, these two different 
things are characterized in nearly the same words. This is illogical. It makes no 
sense to speak o f the impugned provisions {i.e. s. 6(a) o f the Interim Order and ss. 
34 and 35 o f CEPA) as being equally broad as Part II o f the Act. The Interim Order, 
and the exercise o f ss. 34 and 35 to enact it, represent a special invocation o f the 
general powers conferred by Part II; and this special invocation is not “aimed 
a t.. .any and all harmful substances”, as the minority claims. Rather, the Interim 
Order is on its face aimed at only one harmful substance: PCB. Thus, the conclusion 
that the impugned provisions may have a purpose or character as wide as that o f Part 
II — which does concern any and all substances — is simply wrong.
If  this is as logically plain as it seems, why then did the minority reach its 
conclusion? The only way to arrive at such an erroneous characterization o f the 
impugned provisions is to turn one’s back on the constitutional question and the 
facts o f the case -  to shun the factual plane. This is exactly what the minority did, 
as evidenced by this passage:
45 Respondent’s factum, para. 61. Appellant’s factum, para. 82: “La partie II de la LCPE [CEPA] vise 
essentiellement le contrôle de la pollution causée par les produits chimiques”. Interestingly, neither of 
the litigants considered there could be two different pith and substance questions, one corresponding to 
the enabling sections or Part II generally, and another corresponding to the Interim Order. This was the 
argument of the joint factum o f Pollution Probe, Great Lakes United, Canadian Environmental Law 
Association and Sierra Legal Defence Fund, para. 19: “Part II o f CEPA is not directed at the protection 
o f the environment in general. Rather, its true purpose is much more limited: to set national standards 
for the control o f toxic substances. Similarly, the purpose o f the Interim Order is limited to setting 
standards for the control o f  PCBs."
46 Hydro-Québec, supra note 1 at para. 33 [ emphasis added].
With respect, the toxicity of PCBs. while clearly important to the environment itself.
is not directly relevant to this appeal, since what is at issue is not simply the Interim 
Order, but the enabling provisions under which that order was enacted. That is, the 
question is not whether PCBs pose a danger to human health, which it appears they 
clearly do. but whether the Act purports to grant federal regulatory power over 
substances which may not pose such a danger.47
The minority, by its admission, chose to abnegate the facts o f the case. It 
decided the case on the hypothetical plane, and focused not on the constitutional 
validity o f the enabling provisions as they were actually used to enact the Interim 
Order, but on their validity in light o f all the conceivable uses to which they could 
be put, including the notional case where the enabling provisions would be used to 
regulate a substance that posed no danger to health. Whatever the merits o f this 
choice, it cannot be said to comport with the scope of the constitutional question. 
Plainly, this is a faux pas the Court should avoid.
In contrast, the majority’s characterization o f the pith and substance is not 
controversial -  if only for the reason that there hardly is one. Justice La Forest 
breaks with the venerable rule that characterization of the impugned provisions must 
be the first step in constitutional adjudication. In fact, his characterization arises 
only near the end o f the judgment, where it is not decisive in any case.48 He first 
treats the law, invoking the criminal law power and then expanding it to encompass 
environmental protection. Second, he shows how the impugned provisions fit with 
this expanded definition. Last, and by resort to the factual plane, he shows how the 
dangers inherent in PCBs are consistent with the legitimate, and not colourable, use 
o f that power in enacting the Interim Order. That being settled, so is the case. 
Characterization hardly enters into it; the facts of the case certainly do.
Justice La Forest’s reasoning, while perhaps not an orthodox model of 
constitutional adjudication, is a cogent lesson in the contours o f the criminal law 
power. If  the touchstone o f the minority’s approach is a breezy characterization and 
a willful disregard o f the facts, the majority’s approach is explained by a principled 
analysis o f the criminal law power.
47 Ibid. at para. 39 [emphasis added],
48 Ibid. at paras. 146, 149, 155, 156.
In understanding the expansion that Hydro-Québec introduces to the criminal law 
power, it is necessary to recall that power’s earlier development.
In the era o f Canadian Dominion, the Judicial Committee o f the Privy Council 
took a consistently liberal view of the criminal law power, making this perhaps the 
only federal power that it did not diminish over the years. The cases from that time 
affirm two simple propositions about that power. One, that the scope o f federal 
power is accurately conveyed by the plain and generous words of the Constitution: 
“The Criminal Law .. .including the Procedure in Criminal Matters”.49 Two, that the 
hallmark of the criminal law is simply the pairing o f a prohibition with a penalty. 
In the year o f the Statute o f Westminster, Lord Atkin put these propositions thus:
“Criminal law” means “the criminal law in its widest sense...” The power must 
extend to legislation to make new crimes. Criminal law connotes only the quality 
of such acts or omissions as are prohibited under appropriate penal provisions by 
authority of the State. The criminal quality of an act cannot be discerned by 
intuition nor can it be discovered by reference to any standard but one: Is the act 
prohibited with penal consequences?50
It was not long before this definition revealed a fatal flaw, namely, that the 
federal government could trench limitlessly on provincial power by the mere 
adoption of the criminal law form. That deficiency was remedied by the further 
requirement o f a public purpose, introduced by Justice Rand in the Margarine 
Reference and quoted earlier.
With that addition, the criminal law power became the most robust and 
straightforward jurisdiction in the federal catalogue -  a status that has been 
reaffirmed and heightened by a variety o f challenges, not one o f which has 
diminished federal competence.51 The culmination o f this law is deceptively simple 
to state: invoking the criminal law power necessitates only the criminal law form and 
a valid public purpose; exceeding the criminal law power occurs only in cases o f
49 Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(27). In particular, see A-G Ontario v. Hamilton Street Railway Co., 
[1903] A.C. 524 (P.C.) at 528-9.
50 Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. A.G. Canada, [1931] A.C. 310 (P.C.) at 324 [hereinafter 
PATAl
5‘These cases are reviewed in RJR-MacDonald, supra note 2.
colourability52 or violation o f the Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms P  I f  legislation 
satisfies these requirements, that is the end o f the matter, and it is valid as criminal 
law.54 It is fruitless to argue that the purported “criminal” legislation is really a 
regulatory exercise55; that it is not an absolute prohibition, but contains exceptions 
or makes provision to be displaced by equivalent provincial legislation56; or that it 
criminalizes activity collateral to a different activity that is itself legal.57 The 
criminal law power is “plenary in nature” and therefore blind to these considerations
-  a status .that would seem to be beyond dispute since the 7-2 judgment affirming 
these propositions in RJR-Macdonald in 1995.58
But despite the foregoing jurisprudence, there remained uncharted lacunae in the 
criminal law power which would demand attention in Hydro-Québec. Foremost 
among these, neither RJR-Macdonald nor its predecessors explicitly visited the 
question o f  whether the criminal law power can be exceeded simply because its use 
trenches excessively on provincial jurisdiction. In other words, no case has ever 
forcefully rebutted the proposition that the criminal law power may be subordinated 
to the Federal Principle. That possibility would seem to be incompatible with calling 
the criminal law power “plenary”, but only so much meaning can be wrung from one 
word. It is a matter o f some gravity to the balance o f powers if the criminal law 
power is, to draw on a few synonyms, “entire, unqualified, or absolute.”59
52 R. V. Morgentaler, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463, at 487: “Only when the effects of the legislation so directly 
impinge on some other subject matter as to reflect some alternative or ulterior purpose do the effects 
themselves take on analytic significance”, per Sopinka J.; Re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion 
Act, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297; A.G. Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers, [1924] A.C. 328 (P.C.).
53 RJR-Mac Donald, supra note 2; R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452; R. v. Wholesale Travel, [1991] 3 
S.C.R. 154; R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
54 The converse, however, is not true. A law can still be valid as criminal law even if  it does not adopt 
the criminal law form. This is true o f the sections o f the Criminal Code that apply to criminal procedure; 
and it may be true of civil remedies that attach to the criminal process: R. v. Zelensky, [ 1978] 2 S.C.R. 
940.
55 R. v. Wetmore, [ 1983] 2 S.C.R. 284 at 288-9 per Laskin C.J.; R. v. Wholesale Travel, supra note 53.
56 R. v. Furtney, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 89; Lord's Day Alliance o f  Canada v. Attorney General o f British 
Columbia, [1959] S.C.R. 497.
57 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519; Reference re ss. 193 and 
195.1(l)(c) o f  the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 [Prostitution Reference].
58 RJR-MacDonald, supra note 2 at paras. 28, 32, per Lamer C.J. and La Forest J., L'Heureux-Dubé, 
Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin and Iacobucci JJ. (Sopinka and Major JJ. dissenting).
59 Concise Oxford Dictionary, 8th ed. ( 1990).
What is more, the jurisprudence is also silent on a crucial threshold question in 
Hydro-Québec: whether environmental protection is a public purpose consonant 
with the exercise o f the criminal law power. Although Justice Rand took care to 
note in the Margarine Reference that his list o f public purposes was not exhaustive, 
five decades o f  incantation tends to ossify any such usage, to the point that the 
categories o f “public peace, order, security, health, [and] morality” are seen as the 
“ordinary” -  and perhaps inelastic -  ends o f the criminal law power. That is a 
natural conclusion to draw where not a single case since 1949 has expanded on 
Justice Rand’s list.60
3(b)(i). The Plenary Nature of the Criminal Law and the Ghost of the
Charter
In prefacing his judgment on the criminal law power, Justice La Forest does a 
curious thing: he raises, and then speedily rejects, the potential application of Peace, 
Order and Good Government. He does this because he wishes to avoid “profound 
issues respecting the federal structure o f our Constitution which do not arise with 
anything like the same intensity in relation to the criminal law power.”61 What 
exactly does this statement mean?
As I mentioned already, the Constitution is parsimonious toward the 
environment as a subject matter. Both Crown Zellerbach and Oldman River affirm 
the proposition that environmental jurisdiction is not the preserve o f any one level 
o f government, but concurrent to federal and provincial (and since Delgamuukw, 
aboriginai) competence.62 Consequently, federal environmental protection laws 
must “shop around” for support under a head o f s. 91. Each of these heads is unique, 
and possesses particular jurisdictional boundaries.63 The subject-specific heads of 
power, such as navigation (s. 91(10)) or fisheries (s. 91(12)), are, within their 
domain, exercisable without regard to the Federal Principle, save in the case of
60 The nearest the Court has come to expansion is perhaps Laskin C.J.’s dissent in Morgentaler, supra 
note 52.
61 Hydro-Québec, supra note 1 at para. 110.
62 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 at para. 165.
63 “[E]ach constitutional head o f power has its own particular characteristics and raises concerns peculiar 
to itself in assessing it in the balance of Canadian federalism...In the present case, it seems to 
m e...[t]here was a marked attempt to raise concerns appropriate to the national concern doctrine under 
the peace, order and good government clause to the criminal law power in a manner that, in my view, 
is wholly inconsistent with the nature and ambit o f [the criminal law power] as set down by this Court 
from a very early period and continually reiterated since.. ibid. at para. 117.
colourability.64 In other words, these are plenary powers. In contrast, the national 
concern branch o f POGG is infinitely flexible because it is aimed at no single subject 
or jurisdictional domain, although it is very much subject to the Federal Principle.65
What is evidently missing in these permutations is a hybrid head o f power: one 
that combines plenary power with flexible, non-subject based jurisdiction, able to 
encompass many aspects o f the environment. If  it existed, this power would be less 
a fortification o f federal environmental competence than a paradigmatic revolution. 
It would, in precedential value, exceed any number of cases tending toward an 
environmeritally-sympathetic interpretation o f  POGG, or any amount o f judicial 
deference tending against finding environmental evocations o f the subject-specific 
heads o f power colourable. Best o f all, such a power would put a lid on Ottawa’s 
jurisdictional excuses for agnosticism over the environment -  a practiced habit o f the 
Chrétien government.66 If  environmentalists ever dreamt of a model constitutional 
power, this would be it. Which is exactly what the Court gave them.
It is easy to be surprised at how sanguine Justice La Forest seems about this 
result. His approach heralds less a revolution, than an evolution o f the criminal law 
power, traceable to precepts laid down at the turn o f the century. La Forest’s reasons 
are forceful, and bear repeating here:
What appears from the analysis in RJR-MacDonald is that as early as 1903, the 
Privy Council, in Attorney-General fo r  Ontario v. Hamilton Street Railway Co. had 
made it clear that the power conferred on Parliament by s. 91(27) is “the criminal 
law in its widest sense.” Consistently with this approach, the Privy Council in 
Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. Attorney-General fo r  Canada defined the 
criminal law power as including any prohibited act with penal consequences. As it 
put it, ‘The criminal quality of an act cannot be discerned...by reference to any 
standard but one: Is the act prohibited with penal consequences?” This approach has 
been consistently followed ever since and, as RJR-MacDonald relates, it has been 
applied by the courts in a wide variety of settings. Accordingly, it is entirely within
64 Oldman River, supra note 38 at para. 92; for a case of colourability, see Fowler v. The Queen, [ 1980]
2 S.C.R. 213.
65 Crown Zellerbach, supra note 14.
66 To take an example, the Chrétien government has been so slow to recognize its jurisdiction to legislate 
for the protection of endangered species throughout Canada that it has earned a remedial lesson in 
constitutional law from no less than the Canadian Bar Association: Letter from G. Proudfoot and J. 
Marshall Burgess of the CBA, to Canadian Ministers of Environment and Justice, 4 June, 1996. Ottawa 
is so calculatedly aloof to its own powers that even Globe and Mail's editorialists feel the need to point 
out, “Ottawa has the power. It should use it.” See lead editorial of 5 November, and also 2 October,
1996.
the discretion of Parliament to determine what evil it wishes by penal prohibition to 
suppress and what threatened interest it thereby wishes to safeguard...
The Charter apart, only one qualification has been attached to Parliament's plenary 
power over criminal law. The power cannot be employed colourablv.... To 
determine whether such an attempt is being made, it is, of course, appropriate to 
enquire into Parliament's purpose in enacting the legislation. As Estey J. noted in 
[Scowbyv. Glendinning], since the Margarine Reference, it has been “accepted that 
some legitimate public purpose must underlie the prohibition”...
In short, in a case like the present, all one is concerned with is colourabilitv. 
Otherwise, one would, in effect, be reviving the discarded notion that there is a 
“domain” of criminal law, something Rand J., like Lord Atkin before him, was not 
prepared to do.67
Whatever uncertainty lingered over the plenary nature o f the criminal law power 
after RJR-Macdonald must now be dispelled by this passage. The criminal law 
power is an incomparable power, invoked merely by the criminal law form, 
qualified solely by the rule against colourability, the test o f which is that a law must 
pursue a valid public purpose. Incidental effects on provincial jurisdiction are 
emphatically not a consideration. The Federal Principle is entirely irrelevant. As La 
Forest points out, this conclusion is not an advance on RJR-Macdonald, so much as 
a fresh enunciation o f what was already affirmed by seven judges o f the Court in that 
and other cases stretching back to the start o f the century.
But What o f the proposition that the criminal law power may intrude too much 
on provincial jurisdiction? In Justice La Forest’s view, the criminal law need not 
lead to intrusions at all. This is not as unreal as it seems. In his words:
The legitimate use of the criminal law.. .in no way constitutes an encroachment on 
provincial legislative power, though it may affect matters falling within the latter's 
ambit... [T]he use of the federal criminal law power in no way precludes the 
provinces from exercising their extensive powers under s. 92 to regulate and control 
the pollution of the environment either independently or to supplement federal 
action.68
All this says is that the double aspect doctrine is alive and well. Exercises of the 
criminal law power do not preempt provincial jurisdiction, but merely coexist with
61 Hydro-Québec, supra note 1 at paras. 119-122 [Citations omitted; emphasis added].
68 Ibid. at paras. 129 and 131.
it, subject o f course to federal paramountcy. Provincial wings are clipped only in 
so far as necessary to avoid preclusive, irreconcilable conflict with federal law.69 As 
such, the objection that federal environmental jurisdiction will usurp provincial 
power is without merit.
Needless to say, the minority in Hydro-Québec share almost no part o f this view, 
even though the authors o f that opinion (Justices Lamer and Iacobucci) number 
among the majority on the criminal law issue in RJR-Macdonald. Their dissent, as 
in the lower courts, rests on there being a dichotomy between laws that are truly 
“criminal!’ and intra vires Parliament, and laws that are merely “regulatory” and 
ultra vires. By this reasoning Parliament is free to take the extreme step of 
criminalizing PCBs outright, but cannot take the moderate step o f regulating certain 
aspects o f them.70 The trouble with this dichotomy, as the minority admits, is that 
the difference between regulations and crimes is unprincipled and elusive:
Ascertaining whether a particular statute is prohibitive or regulatory in nature is 
often more of an art than a science. As Cory J. acknowledged in Knox Contracting, 
supra, what constitutes criminal law is often “easier to recognize than define” (p.
347). Some guidelines have, however, emerged from previous jurisprudence.
The fact that a statute contains a prohibition and a penalty does not necessarily mean 
that statute is criminal in nature. Regulatory statutes commonly prohibit violations 
of their provisions or regulations promulgated under them and provide penal 
sanctions to be applied if violations do, in fact, occur. [As] La Forest J. himself 
recognized in Thomson Newspapers v. Canada and in R. v. McKinlay Transport, the 
penalties that are provided in a regulatory context serve a “pragmatic” or 
“instrumental” purpose and do not transform the legislation into criminal law. (Also 
see Wetmore, supra, Scowby, supra', Knox Contracting, supra).11
The minority cites cases that supposedly draw a distinction between crimes and 
regulations, but do not quote one supportive passage among them.72 The distinction 
separating criminal law from mere regulation turns on the “context” and the “nature 
and extent of...regulation”, but the minority offers up no test or normative guidance
69 Multiple Access v. McCutcheon, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161.
70 “Nothing, in our view, prevents Parliament from outlawing certain kinds of behaviour on the basis that 
they are harmful to the environment. But such legislation must actually seek to outlaw this behaviour, 
not merely regulate it.”: Hydro-Québec, supra note 1 at para. 61 [emphasis in original],
71 Ibid. at paras. 45-46 [citations omitted].
72 Ibid. at paras. 46-47.
to assist in demarcating the frontier.73 Justices Lamer and Iacobucci are correct to 
call this “more o f an art than a science.”
When judgments are tendentious as this, they deserve scrutiny. When one 
examines the cases the minority cites for the ostensible criminal-regulatory 
dichotomy, it is striking how these actually undermine its reasoning.
Wetmore is probably the most glaring example.74 In this challenge to the federal 
Food and Drugs Act, the impugned provisions prohibited manufacturing drugs under 
unsanitary conditions and engaging in deceptive advertising. Writing for the 
majority on the constitutional question, Chief Justice Laskin considered that “the 
various provisions o f the Food and Drugs Act [go] beyond mere prohibition to bring 
it solely within s. 91(27) but...also involve a prescription o f standards, including 
labeling and packaging as well as control o f manufacture.” For that reason, he 
opined that the provision governing deceptive advertising, unlike the rest o f the Act, 
“certainly invites the application o f the trade and commerce power.”75 Now, lest this 
comment be interpreted as taking the advertising provisions outside the criminal law 
power, Laskin continues:
However, it is unnecessary to pursue [the trade and commerce] issue and it has been 
well understood over many years that protection of food and other products against 
adulteration and to enforce standards of purity are properly assigned to the criminal 
law.76
To the extent that Wetmore supports a criminal-regulatory dichotomy, it does so in 
obiter dicta that is contradicted by the holding o f the case, which is that all the 
provision^ o f the Food And Drugs Act -  “regulatory” or not -  are criminal.77
73 Ibid. at para. 48.
74 R.\. Wetmore, supra note 55.
75 Ibid. at 288-9.
76 Ibid. at 289.
771 think it is fair to conclude that Wetmore exemplifies an established proposition of the criminal law: 
that federal legislation in the criminal law form which prohibits or regulates dangerous or unhealthful 
things is intra vires the criminal law power. See the challenges to: Hazardous Substances Act in R. v. 
Cosman’s Furniture ( 1976), 32 C.C.C. (2d) 345 (Man. C.A.); and the predecessor to the Food and Drugs 
Act in Standard Sausage v. Lee, [1934] 1 D.L.R. 706 (B.C.C.A.), where Martin J.A. writes at 718 that 
“It is beyond question that, in the due exercise of National powers over criminal law, Provincial civil 
rights may be interfered with and drastically curtailed.” This proposition is only negatived if the thing 
is not actually dangerous or unhealthful, in which case the law is ultra vires because it is colourable. 
See the challenges to: Dairy Industry Act in the Margarine Reference-, and a case involving
So if the idea o f a criminal-regulatory dichotomy does not hail from the criminal 
law jurisprudence, what exactly is its origin? I believe The minority uprooted a 
shoot o f Charter law, and sought to transplant it in the soil o f federalism. This is 
apparent by the cases the minority cites, particularly Thomson Newspapers.78 Justice 
La Forest in that case drew a distinction between “real crimes” and “public welfare” 
offences for the purpose o f deciding whether s. 8 of the Charter is violated by 
compelling a corporation under subpoena to disclose documents for an investigation 
under the Combines Investigation Act.79 The pivotal issue was whether the 
corporation had a reasonable expectation o f privacy protected by s. 8. Strikingly, 
Justice La Forest’s begins his judgment on this question by distancing it from 
federalism:
I think the initial question can be stated in the following form: what degree of 
privacy can those subject to investigation under the Combines Investigation Act 
reasonably expect in respect of the activities and matters with which such 
investigation may be concerned? In approaching this question, I would first of all 
point out that I do not regard the fact that the Act and its predecessors were 
characterized as criminal law for the purposes of division-of-powers analysis as at 
all determinative.80
In the result, La Forest observes that “public welfare” offences attract a lesser 
moral and social stigma than do “true crimes”, and for this reason merit a lesser 
expectation o f privacy that lies outside the protection o f s. 8 of the Charter. This 
dichotomy is based in social opprobrium, and no more.
The minority’s error, therefore, is to suppose that a “public welfare” character 
for Charter purposes is concurrent with a “regulatory” pith and substance for 
federalism purposes, when there is no principled reason why this should be. The 
Charter, after all, only enters into a case like Thomson Newspapers because we are 
concerned with a personal right o f a witness. Is there a counterpart to this personal 
right in the Constitution Act, 1867 that gives the “public welfare - true crime” 
dichotomy relevance here? Concurrencies between different areas o f the law only 
make sense where there is a common essence; for example, liability in tort and
compositional standards under the Food and Drugs Act, Labatt Breweries v. Canada, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 
914.
78 Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director o f  Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade 
Practices Commission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425. See also Wholesale Travel Croup, supra note 53.
79 Thomson Newspapers, supra note 78 at 510.
80 Ibid. at 508.
contract can merge because both concern obligations between parties and their 
breach. It would be an eerie coincidence indeed if a dichotomy that were drawn for 
the purpose o f  judging a witness’ personal right to resist a subpoena for documentary 
evidence were also meaningful in delimiting the frontiers o f federal legislative 
competence -  particularly when that competence has been shaped by a juridical 
history o f its own that predates the Charter by a century! This is a classic apples- 
and-oranges error, but the minority makes it more than once. Indeed, it is the 
gravamen o f their judgment.81
At bottom, I believe the judges on the Hydro-Québec court were split by their 
readiness or reluctance to create a plenary environmental jurisdiction. That is, the 
minority was more wedded to the Federal Principle than the majority. But having 
said this, there can be no doubt that the jurisprudence recognized the plenary nature 
o f criminal law long before Hydro-Québec came around -  and this fact cannot have 
been lost on Justices Lamer and Iacobucci, who cheerfully endorsed plenary power 
in RJR-Macdonaldby siding with the majority on the criminal law question. So why 
the switch? Consider this passage from their dissent:
Almost everything we do involves “polluting” the environment in some way. The 
impugned provisions purport to grant regulatory authority over all aspects of any 
substance whose release into the environment “ha[s] o r ... may have an immediate 
or long-term harmful effect on the environment” (s. 11(a)). One wonders just what, 
if anv. role will be left for the provinces in dealing with environmental pollution if 
the federal government is given such total control over the release of these 
substances. Moreover, the countless spheres of human activity, both collective and 
individual, which could potentially fall under the ambit of the Act are apparent. 
Many of them fall within areas of jurisdiction granted to the provinces under s. 92. 
Granting Parliament the authority to regulate so completely the release of substances 
into the environment bv determining whether or not they are "toxic" would not only
81 Consider this passage, at para. 55, where the minority disapproved of the fact that CEPA regulations 
(and thus, criminal prohibitions) are made at the discretion of the Ministers o f Health and the 
Environment: “It would be an odd crime whose definition was made entirely dependent on the discretion 
o f the Executive. This further suggests that [CEPA's] true nature is regulatory, not criminal and that the 
offences created by s. 113 are regulatory offences, not ‘true crimes’: see Wholesale Travel, supra note 
53, per Cory J. In Wholesale Travel, Cory J. resorts to a pre-Charter distinction between “true crimes” 
and “regulatory offences” in deciding what degree of culpability or mens rea these different types of 
offences demand under s. 7 o f the Charter. As with Thomson Newspapers, the Wholesale Travel 
judgment is not the least bit concerned with federalism -  only the Charter. It accordingly has no place 
in the analysis o f federalism issues in Hydro-Québec.
inescapably preclude the possibility of shared environmental jurisdiction: it would
also infringe severely on other heads of power assigned to the provinces.82
This dissent is motivated by fear. The spectre of the Federal Principle caving 
in to unilateral, federal “environmental imperialism” cried out, I believe, to the 
dissenting justices to throw up a bulwark in whatever plausible form. In the event, 
their bulwark was a chip off Charter law; and it was sufficiently plausible to split the 
Court 5-4. But consider this deep irony: had the dissenting justices carried a majority 
and incorporated the Federal Principle into the criminal law power, the end result 
would have shattered a century o f criminal law jurisprudence and upset the balance 
o f powers incalculably more than the very environmental legislation they perceived 
as threatening. Even the most thoughtful judicial conservatism, it would seem, can 
backfire dangerously.
3(b)(ii). The Public Purpose of Environmental Protection
Criminal law must be supported by a public purpose, or it is colourable. That means 
that if  a law’s pith and substance is not rationally connected to the attainment o f a 
public purpose, the law will fail. The lack o f connection may exist either because 
extrinsic evidence demonstrates the law was passed for an ulterior motive; or if the 
motive is proper, because the law is flawed in a way that one cannot conceive how 
it advances a public purpose.83
The second o f these pitfalls arose in Hydro-Québec. Recall that the minority 
entertained the case on the hypothetical plane and equated the pith and substance of 
the impugned provisions with the pith and substance o f Part II, being “the wholesale 
regulation by federal agents o f any and all substances which may harm any aspect 
o f the environment or which may present a danger to human life or health”. Leaving 
aside whether this is the “correct” characterization, if it is accepted it creates a 
formidable problem: namely, that “wholesale regulation.. .of the environment” lies 
well outside o f the public purposes in the Margarine Reference.
There are two ways to resolve this problem. The easy way, o f course, is to treat 
the case on the factual plane. Since there can be no doubt that PCBs endanger 
health, and that the Interim Order was enacted for this legitimate reason, that alone
82 Hydro-Québec, supra note 1 at para. 60 [emphasis added].
83 Re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act [ulterior motive], supra note 52; and Margarine 
Reference [irrationality], supra note 25.
suffices to bring the impugned provisions within the Margarine Reference and dispel 
the suggestion o f colourability.
The majority recognized that the impugned provisions were valid criminal law 
in relation to the protection o f health, and had they wished, they could have settled 
the case on this finding alone.84 Thankfully, it did not. Surprising even those who 
argued in CEPA’s defence, Justice La Forest revisited the elderly Margarine 
Reference and, for the first time since 1949, added to it a new and breathtaking 
public purpose:
During the argument in the present case.. .one sensed, at times, a tendency, even by 
the appellant and the supporting interveners, to seek justification solely for the 
purpose of the protection of health specifically identified by Rand J. Now I have no 
doubt that that purpose obviously will support a considerable measure of 
environmental legislation, as perhaps also the ground of security. But I entertain no 
doubt that the protection of a clean environment is a public purpose within Rand J.'s 
formulation in the Margarine Reference. cited supra, sufficient to support a criminal 
prohibition. It is surely an “interest threatened” which Parliament can legitimately 
“safeguard”, or to put it another way, pollution is an “evil” that Parliament can 
legitimately seek to suppress. Indeed...it is a public purpose of superordinate 
importance: it constitutes one of the major challenges of our time. It would be 
surprising indeed if Parliament could not exercise its plenary power over criminal 
law to protect this interest and to suppress the evils associated with it by appropriate 
penal prohibitions.85
This is arguably the most important paragraph ever written in Canadian 
environmental law. Not only does it catapult pollution prevention onto a generous, 
plenary constitutional footing, but it does so with the unanimous voice o f the court: 
even the dissenting Justices agreed with this expansion o f the criminal law power.86 
It is therefore surely a point o f settled law that “the protection o f a clean 
environment” -  in its own right and wholly apart from anthropocentric values -  is 
a legitimate public purpose within the competence o f Parliament.
84 ‘T he specific provision impugned in this case, the Interim Order, would seem to me to be justified as 
a criminal prohibition for the protection of human life and health alone.”: per La Forest J. at para. 132.
85 Hydro-Québec, supra note 1 at para. 123 [emphasis added].
86 ‘T o  the extent that La Forest J. suggests that this legislation is supportable as relating to health, 
therefore, we must respectfully disagree. We agree with him, however, that the protection of the 
environment is itself a legitimate criminal public purpose, analogous to those cited in the Margarine 
Reference, supra note 25 per Lamer C.J. and Iacobucci J. at para. 43.
3(c). Consequences for the Future Development of Environmental and
Criminal Law
However, the above passage leaves one very important question unanswered: are 
other insults to the environment, apart from pollution, also “evils” within 
Parliament’s jurisdiction to suppress by the criminal law? That is to say, is the new 
public purpose created by the Court in Hydro-Québec sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate environmental laws other than those aimed at pollution prevention 
(what I will refer to as the “wide” interpretation), or should Hydro-Québec be taken 
to mean that federal competence now extends pollution prevention but no farther 
(the “narrow” interpretation)?
This question must be resolved in favor o f the wide interpretation. Justice La 
Forest articulates the general principle that, “the stewardship o f the environment is 
a fundamental value of our society and that Parliament may use [the] criminal law 
power to underline that value.”87 The logical inference is that the criminal law 
power is appropriate to all matters implicating environmental stewardship, and is not 
qualified or limited to those cases concerning pollution. This would also seem to be 
the view o f Justices Lamer and Iacobucci, who write that “the protection o f the 
environment is itself a legitimate criminal public purpose.”88
These passages, and support they lend the wide interpretation, are reinforced by 
the teleology underlying Hydro-Québec. “The major challenge o f our time” to 
which Justice La Forest refers certainly does not end with the struggle against 
pollution, for environmental harm is a many-headed monster. A polluting PCB spill 
is an “evil” that attracts societal disapprobation, but the same could be said o f the 
wanton ravaging o f a forest, or the extinction o f an endangered species. If  Parliament 
decides to criminalize these other “evils” at some later date, it logically should be 
within its jurisdiction to do so. Encompassing other environmental matters in this 
way comports with the “living tree” approach to constitutional interpretation, and 
respects the basic teleology of Hydro-Québec that the criminal law power should 
“keep pace with and protect our emerging values.”89 The narrow alternative -  that
87 Ibid. at para. 127.
88 Ibid. at para. 43.
89 Ibid. at para. 127.
the criminal law be ossified and frozen in the values o f a past time -  is by 
comparison logically impoverished.90
4. AFTERWARD - Whither (or wither) Federal Constitutional Power?
So, in the end, is Hydro-Québec is a revolution after all? And if so, whose 
revolution is it, anyway?
Constitutional conservatives and pro-industry “browns” will likely share a dim 
view o f Hydro-Québec. One commentator, writing in a waste industry magazine, 
accuses the Court o f “twisting established legal principles” in glossing over the 
distinction between criminal and regulatoiy law.91 Others, more alarmist, predict that 
Hydro-Québec may be federal Canada’s Waterloo. One eminent constitutional law 
scholar foretells a “serious threat both to the integrity o f the country’s federal 
structure and to the rule o f law.” because the Court has left the federal government 
free “to dictate to the provinces what their environmental protection policies would 
be.” The practical effect, we are told, is to “reverse the Court’s earlier rulings on the 
environment and give the federal government exclusive jurisdiction in the field.92
These complaints cannot be taken seriously. The only legal principle that Hydro- 
Québec “twisted” is, thankfully, to relieve us o f the mistaken notion that the criminal 
law power is subject to a criminal-regulatory dichotomy, when in fact the cases that 
consider this dichotomy (such as Wetmore) expressly state that regulations are intra 
vires that power. As to the threat o f Ottawa usurping provincial power, the very 
essence of the double aspect doctrine is that jurisdiction is never ‘exclusive,’ but 
shared between the provincial and federal levels. These rules are established law, not 
new inventions, and there is no logical reason to fear that the majority o f the Court 
has done anything the least bit radical in Hydro-Québec. The ‘living tree’ o f the 
Constitution and federal power remains exactly that, and it is not becoming a 
‘creeping vine,’ whatever is said about it.
90 There was at one time the belief that the criminal law power was bound to a“domain of criminal 
jurisprudence”: Board o f  Commerce case, [1922] 1 A.C. 191 at 198-99. This idea was subsequently 
rejected in PAT A, supra note 50.
’’Dianne Saxe, ‘T he Environment and the Constitution: Who Won?” (1997) 9 Hazardous Materials 
Management Magazine 62.
92 David Beatty, "Canadian Constitutional Law in a Nutshell" (1998) 36 Alta. L. R. 605, at 611-12.
But if  these critics are wrong, so too may be the smug ‘greens’ who regard 
Hydro-Québec as a revolutionary legal victory. Victory it may be, but victory and 
revolution are two remarkably different things.
Politics often show us that formal interpretations of the Constitution have little 
bearing on reality. The irony of Hydro-Québec and the creation o f a plenary federal 
jurisdiction over the environment is that such a power has perhaps never been so 
passé. Ottawa is avoiding and devolving environmental jurisdictions faster than the 
Supreme Court can declare them. The Court is filling a leaky cup.
Take the case o f endangered species protection. The federal first government 
introduced a bill for this purpose in 1996, where it died on the Order Paper.93 
Throughout the legislative process, provinces, resource industries and, incredibly, 
the Canadian Wildlife Service insisted that federal jurisdiction to protect endangered 
species’ habitat was limited to federal lands only, and could on no account extend 
to private or provincial lands, this being a local and private matter in the province.94 
Were this argument accepted, the law would be limited to protecting habitat on only 
5% o f Canada’s land area south o f sixty degrees -  feeble protection for most o f 
Canada’s species. The bill, thankfully, died on the Order Paper.
Now, with Hydro-Québec behind it, environmentalists might reasonably expect 
Ottawa to take a more robust approach to endangered species, but this is not so. In 
March 2000 the Chrétien government introduced a new bill, the Species at Risk Act 
(SARA), which is scarcely less timid than its predecessor.95 The new bill is a bundle 
o f contradictions: true to the criminal law form, it invokes prohibitions and penalties 
to forbid, inter alia, destroying an endangered species’ critical habitat, but again the 
law hesitates at crossing on to provincial lands. The Governor in Council may 
extend the prohibition to certain, limited provincial lands, but only if  the province 
has asked for this, or if the province has declined to take measures (possibly falling 
far short o f a  prohibition) on its own. Even then, the federal prohibition expires after 
five years unless the Governor in Council renews it.96
93 Canadian Endangered Species Protection Act, Bill C-65,35th Parliament.
94 With the exception of migratory birds and aquatic species, which are already subjects of federal law.
95 Species at Risk Act, Bill C-33,36th Parliament.
96 See ss. 61, 97 of SARA (first reading).
This kid gloves treatment makes no sense, except as an act o f a federal 
government reluctant to govern. The legislative scheme is more easily explained as 
an attempt to impose no federal mandate on provinces, rather than a scheme to 
reduce overlap in jurisdiction over wildlife (more will be said about the “problem”of 
overlapping jurisdiction later). The automatic loss of the prohibition after five years 
is even more curious, unless one supposes that “evil” the criminal prohibition cures 
(habitat destruction that is ignored by a province) automatically loses its repugnancy 
after five years too. SARA is an intra vires, if  incredibly cynical, invocation o f the 
criminal law power, because as the Canadian public sees it endangering rare life 
forms to the edge o f extinction is an “evil” that truly ought to be suppressed. Indeed, 
how else to explain the fact that fully 97% of Canadians polled by Environment 
Canada in 1996 believe that it is “important” to protect species’ habitat?97
I f  SARA illustrates the studious avoidance o f the potency o f the criminal law 
power, even worse is the case where the Chrétien government essentially devolves 
that power. Only months after Hydro-Québec, federal and provincial environment 
ministers signed the Canada-Wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization (the 
“Harmonization Accord”), and three sub-agreements thereunder respecting 
environmental assessment, enforcement o f environmental laws, and the setting of 
pollution standards under laws such as CEPA — all areas formally within federal 
jurisdiction.98 This event has triggered an unprecedented shift in the exercise of 
jurisdiction. The essence o f the Harmonization Accord is that the “order of 
government best situated” to a particular environmental matter will have conduct o f 
that matter for both levels o f government; and that consequently, “the other order of 
government shall not act...for the period o f time as determined by the relevant sub­
agreement”, regardless o f  what its formal jurisdiction in law may be."  Under the
97 A National Public Opinion Survey o f  Current Environmental Issues, Draft Final Report Prepared for 
Environment Canada (obtained under the Access to Information Act), November 1996. O f the 
respondents, 74% said it was “very important”, and 23% said it was “somewhat important” to protect 
species’ habitats.
98 See the Canadian Council o f Ministers of the Environment at http://www.mbnet.mb.ca/ccme (no 
period). In particular see the Canada- Wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization, and the three sub­
agreements on Environmental Assessment, Environmental Inspections, and Environmental Standards. 
Future harmonization sub-agreements are contemplated in areas such as monitoring and reporting, 
environmental emergencies, and research and development: see Guide to the Canada Wide Accord on 
Environmental Harmonization, at: http://www.ccme.ca/3e_priorities/3ea_harmonization/ 
3eal_accord/3eala.html (no period).
99 See Items 3 and 6 under the heading “Sub-Agreements” in the Canada-Wide Accord on Environmental 
Harmonization.
Harmonization Accord, the “other order o f government” must simply decline to 
exercise its jurisdiction.
Since the “order o f government best situated” in respect o f an environmental 
matter will doubtless turn predominantly on territorial grounds, the practical effect 
o f the Harmonization Accord and its sub-agreements is that on provincial lands 
(95% o f Canada’s land base south of sixty degrees), provincial authorities alone will 
enforce federal environmental laws, set federal toxics standards, and carry out 
federal environmental assessments. This sort o f co-operative federalism, while 
attractive in theory, has been shown to fail the law and the environment before.100 
What is more, it bears more than passing resemblance to a constitutionally forbidden 
scheme: interdelegation. As it stands, the law rightly forbids Parliament to empty 
its hands o f a jurisdiction in favor o f a provincial Legislature101; but it seems that a 
cabal o f Environment Ministers can, by a Harmonization Accord that was not voted 
by Parliament and is not easily susceptible to judicial review, achieve more or less 
the same result.
One may ask why harmonization is being done. The leading rationale is to 
“prevent overlapping activities and inter-jurisdictional disputes” in matters
100 A recent lawsuit against the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans is illustrative. Section 42.1 o f the 
federal Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14, requires the Minister to lay before Parliament an annual 
“report on the administration and enforcement of the provisions of [the] Act relating to fish habitat 
protection and pollution prevention.” The Minister failed to do this in 1995, 1996 and 1997. By the 
Minister’s own admission, this was because the Act’s administration had been so thoroughly devolved 
to the provinces that it became impossible for DFO to tabulate the data required for the report! The 
Minister ultimately consented to the relief sought by the lawsuit. See The Friends o f  the Oldman River 
and the United Fishermen and Allied Workers ’ Union v. Minister o f  Fisheries and Oceans, Federal 
Court (Trial Division) file no. T-284-98 (February 19, 1998).
In the context of endangered species protection, the federal government and the provinces have 
signed the National Accord for the Protection o f Species at Risk, which abandons plenary federal 
jurisdiction over endangered species protection in favor of “complementary federal and 
provincial/territorial legislation, regulations, policies, and programs”. While complementary action 
could, in principle, create a seamless fabric of species protection throughout Canada, the prospect that 
it will is laughable. For instance, just months before signing the Accord, the BC Minister of 
Environment wrote in a confidential letter to the International Woodworkers o f America that “this 
government does not intend to introduce endangered species legislation...because I have recognized the 
points you make as a trade union”. The BC government has since “taken the position that it does not 
need ‘stand alone’ endangered species protection to deliver” its obligations under the Accord. See 
Betraying Our Trust, Sierra Legal Defence Fund (1998), at 14; National Accord for the Protection o f  
Species at Risk, available at http://www.ec.gc.ca/press/wild_b_e.htm (no period).
101 Re Nova Scotia Interdelegation, [ 1951 ] S.C.R. 31 ; W. R. Lederman, “Some Forms and Limitations 
of Cooperative Federalism” (1967) 45 Can. Bar. Rev. 409.
concerning the environment. Few who have examined harmonization are persuaded 
by this, including, notably, the Liberal MPs who sit on the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development. A recent report o f that 
Committee concluded that “there is insufficient evidence of overlap and duplication 
o f environmental regulations or activities o f the federal and provincial/territorial 
governments”, and that as a result, “it seems doubtful...that the [Harmonization] 
Accord and Sub-Agreements will be successful in achieving greater administrative 
efficiency or cost savings.”102 Other critics have put it more curtly: “[t]he 
Harmonization Accord is a solution in search o f a problem.”103
If  it is to be seen for what it is, the rationale behind harmonization is something 
more foul. Harmonization is the abnegation o f formal constitutional authority and 
federal stewardship over the environment, as the price of comity in a federal system. 
It is the offering-up o f the environment as sacrificial lamb, so that Ottawa is free to 
expend political capital in struggling with other balance o f power issues. 
Harmonization is a crass offence against the environment, and taken to its 
fulfillment, it will also become a hazardous waste upon the constitutional landscape 
pronounced by the Court in Hydro-Québec. It is presently being litigated before the 
Federal Court.104 That Court will do well to consider the fundamental, traditional 
principles o f federalism that undergird Hydro-Québec and its antecedents — RJR- 
MacDonald, the Margarine Reference, PAT A and other cases — and ask what place, 
if  any, harmonization has in the bedrock scheme of the Constitution and Canadian 
federation.
102 “Harmonization and Environmental Protection: An Analysis of the Harmonization Initiative o f the 
Canadian Council of Ministers o f the Environment”, a report of the Standing Committee on 
Environment and Sustainable Development, December 1997, at http://www.parl.gc.ca/36/1/ 
parlbus/commbus/house/ensu/reports/ensurpOl-e.htm (no period). See in particular Recommendation 
Number 1.
103 S. Elgie, “The Harmonization Accord: A Solution in Search of a Problem”, ( 1997) 6 Canada Watch 
10, at 11.
104 Canadian Environmental Law Association v. The Minister o f the Environment, Federal Court file no. 
T-337-98. An appeal is underway, though as already noted an agreement signed between ministers, and 
not in the execution of any disclosed statutory power, is not easily susceptible to judicial review.
